Can U.S-North Korea Denuclearisation Talks Be Saved After a Failed Second Summit?

A second summit between United States President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, in the Vietnamese capitol Hanoi has past without any agreement.

President Trump said that he could not agree to Chairman Kim’s demands for lifting all sanctions on North Korea, in exchange for dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korean officials rebuked Trump’s comments, stating that they only wanted some key sanction lifted. It seems that both sides were not willing to budge and find some middle ground towards a first major agreement on the issue of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.     .

With two summits past, surely a third meeting between President Trump and Chairman Kim could only occur in the future if there is much more groundwork between diplomats from both sides. I was sceptical of the first summit in Singapore in 2018, but afterwards agreed that it was a ice breaker of shorts, to get the ball rolling. Even though the outcome of the first summit was just a vague statement agreed between the two leaders, the future was looking brighter.

Over the eight month gap between summits, senior diplomats met numerous times, including U.S Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his North Korean counterpart Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho. I was think when the second summit was announced, the diplomats had reached either an agreement ready to be signed or at least a roadmap to present at the summit, but from the sudden collapse of talks, this does not seem the case.

So what next? It’s too early to speculate on a long term path, but signs of North Korea rebuilding their main rocket launch sight in Sohae, and images indicating a planned missile launch at the Sanumdong facility, are not good signs for future negotiations. If these actions are true, Chairman Kim is just trying to pressure the U.S into making concessions.

If both sides are truly interested in finding a solution, a long term road map is required. The issue is how to come to an agreed roadmap, as both sides differ on what denuclearisation means. The Trump administration wants a Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programme, and Chairman Kims wants full sanctions relieve and security guarantees (including an official peace agreement). To overcome these differences, as indicated at the failed second summit, some slight sanctions relieve may be required to allow North Korea to follow through with commitments they have announced, including dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex. If both parties can agree to some small concessions, I think this could be a way forward in future talks.

More trust is required between both sides. Perhaps as been mentioned by experts, a liaison office in both countries, will assist in coordinating future negotiations on a more regular basis. Also, a more multilateral path in negotiations could spur on further discussions. Although, the Six-party talks in the early 2000s failed, more involvement of both South Korea and China could be the key to overcome differences between American and North Korean objectives. As China is the only major backer of North Korea, and South Korea forging greater relations with their counterparts in the North — and with both counties likely to suffer most in any military conflict between the U.S and North Korea, their direct involvement in discussions are paramount in a future roadmap to denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula.

What could transpire from the Trump and Kim summit?

After a year of “Rocket Man” and “Dotard,” President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim-Jong-un have meet each other at a summit in June, in Singapore. It is the first time a sitting American President has met with a North Korean leader — President Clinton came close to visiting Pyongyang in 2000, but he declined in the end. 

This summit (or show) was an on-off and on-again affair, with a week before the planned summit, Trump cancelled it. After a rush of shuttle diplomacy between U.S and North Korean officials, both sides buried their differences for the good of international peace making. 

As expected, the summit came with lots of hype, but not much else. A vague joint statement was signed, but no plan to achieve any of the aims of what was discussed or verbally agreed — only just reaffirmed Kim’s intentions of denuclearisation and peace on the Korean peninsula.  On the other hand, Trump, the next day gave away a major concession of military pressure by cancelling future U.S-South Korea war games, stating financial reasons. Kim has seemed to have got the most out of the summit, by just meeting with a sitting American President — something his father or grandfather never achieved. In propaganda terms, this was a major coup for Kim and his regime. The days after the summit, the North Korean media was plasted with photos of the meeting and the handshake between the two leaders. The Kim regime had finally got want they wanted. So, what next? 

It has been over six weeks since the summit between the two leaders, but there has been no further progress in terms denuclearisation. President Trump has just been tweeting all sorts of self-gratitude on how he will rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons and bring peace to the Korean peninsula. As for Kim Jong-un, he has not publicly mentioned any further details about denuclearisation. Since the summit there has been another visit by the U.S Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, who was met with calls of “gangster-like mindset” by the North Korean officials. The Secretary of State did not even meet Kim, as planned, as he had on previous visits to Pyongyang.

                                                                     

Such an historical event ran the risk of failing to bring about an acceptable outcome for both sides. Even though Kim had told the South Koreans that he is willing to denuclearise if he was given security guarantees by America, there is no evidence or signals that he would hand over all of the weapons and allow access to international inspectors. Difference in definition of denuclearisation is another stumbling block to a peaceful resolution. North Korea view denuclearisation as a Korean peninsula free of all nuclear threats, where the U.S see the prism as North Korea must approach the issue as a Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear programme.   

why would Kim do such a thing? North Korea has spent decades defying the international community, in light of increasing sanctions to build a nuclear and ballistic missile capability, which has become the regimes guarantor of survival. Perhaps the latest sanctions have finally impacted the North Korean economy to such a state that the Kim regime has decided to seek negotiations with America and the international community? The latest UN sanctions have almost placed a total import and export ban on most goods, although issues of implementation have allowed some illegal goods to enter and leave North Korea. 

As for America, are they in a position to offer a workable security guarantee, meaning that Kim feels safe that America will not try to attack North Korea or bring about regime change, as had happened to Colonel Gaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq? The only meaningful guarantee would be the removal of American troops from South Korea (and possibly Japan); and a formal peace agreement, bringing the Korean war to an official end. The stumbling block would be the removal of American troops in the region.  

China would welcome news of a U.S troop withdrawal, but this would mean an American pivot away from the region and could lead to souring relations with South Korea and Japan, (and we can’t forget Taiwan). The U.S has been for over seven decades the security guarantor for both Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, offering a nuclear umbrella, but a deal with Kim Jong-un could dismantle these alliances. If this situation does occur, China will be in a much stronger position, why’ll America will be weaker. China will have free reign on their doorstep to become the sole regional power, dictating future geopolitics in East Asia.